

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 PHNOM 12305 131231Z

43

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 002628

R 131020Z SEP 74

FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7692

INFO CINCPAC

S E C R E T PHNOM PENH 12305

EXDIS

PASS DIA

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINS, MOPS, CB

SUBJECT: KC SECTOR 33 APPROACH TO GKR

1. AT SEPTEMBER 12 MEETING I BRIEFED PRIME MINISTER LONG BORET ON DEVELOPMENTS THIS SUBJECT DURING HIS ABSENCE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF HAVING HIM PRIMED IN CASE THE MARSHAL OR SOSTHENE FERNANDEZ SHOULD CONSULT HIM ON IT.

2. LONG BORET SAID THAT THE FIRST APPROACH FROM SECTOR 33 KC HAD BEEN MADE TO HIM PERSONALLY, BY THE SAME FORMER POLICE OFFICER WHO EVENTUALLY APPROACHED SOSTHENE FERNANDEZ. THIS MAN HAD COME TO HIM ON AUGUST 21 WITH THE IDENTICAL PROPOSAL THAT PAK NEAM HAS BEEN USING IN HIS VARIOUS CONTACTS, WITH THE SAME LIST OF PEOPLE, HEAVY ARMAMENTS AND CONDITIONS FOR A RALLYING TO THE GKR SIDE. LONG BORET SAID HE HAD IMMEDIATELY TAKEN THE MATTER TO THE MARSHAL AND HAD ARGUED STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF GKR ACCEPTANCE OF THE SECTOR 33 OFFER.

3. THE MARSHAL'S RESPONSE WAS THAT HE HAD IN THE PAST BEEN SWINDLED ("ROULE") MANY TIMES BY SUPPOSED RALLIERS. LONG BORET SAID HE TRIED TO CONVINCE THE MARSHAL THAT THIS OFFER DIFFERED FROM MANY OTHERS IN ONE IMPORTANT RESPECT AND FOR THAT REASON IT HAD TO BE TAKEN VERY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 PHNOM 12305 131231Z

SERIOUSLY. THE WAY IT DIFFERED, THE PRIME MINISTER EX-

PLAINED, WAS THAT IN THIS CASE THERE WAS NO DEMAND FOR A LARGE BUNDLE OF CASH TO BE HANDED OVER IN ADVANCE TO THE PROSPECTIVE RALLIERS. ALL THAT THE SECTOR 33 PEOPLE WERE ASKING FOR WAS A FEW COMMISSIONS ("GALONS"), WHICH WAS A VERY CHEAP PRICE TO PAY FOR WHAT WAS BEING OFFERED. IF THE THING DIDN'T WORK OUT, THE PRIME MINISTER CONTINUED, IT WOULD BE A SIMPLE MATTER TO CANCEL THE COMMISSIONS.

4. LONG BORET SAID THAT HE ALSO TOOK THE LINE WITH THE MARSHAL THAT THE GKR DOES NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES NEEDED TO RECONQUER A LARGE PIECE OF TERRITORY SUCH AS SECTOR 33 AND THEREFORE IT OUGHT TO TRY TO "BUY IT BACK" BY MEANS OF AGREEING TO THE KC'S TERMS FOR A CEASEFIRE. LONG BORET SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY HE HAD LEFT PHNOM PENH BEFORE HE COULD CONVINCE THE MARSHAL THAT THIS WAS A GENUINE OFFER WHICH OUGHT TO BE TREATED SERIOUSLY. HE WAS PLEASED THAT THERE HAD APPARENTLY BEEN MAJOR PROGRESS DURING HIS ABSENCE AND THAT SOSTHENE HAD SUCCEEDED IN GETTING THE MARSHAL TO APPROVE THE GRANTING OF THE REQUESTED COMMISSIONS.

5. LONG BORET COMMENTED THAT FOR YEARS HE HAS DISAGREED WITH THE FANK LEADERSHIP ON HOW TO DEAL WITH RALLIERS. HE SAID THAT THE MILITARY INSISTED THEY BE INTERGRATED INTO THE FANK AND THEN TRANSFERRED TO THE OTHER END OF THE COUNTRY, FAR AWAY FROM THEIR FORMER AREA OF OPERATIONS. LONG BORET SAID HIS OWN VIEW IS THAT THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH SIZEABLE GROUPS OF RALLIERS IS TO ARRANGE A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE AND TO LET THEM CONTINUE HOLDING THE TERRITORY THEY OCCUPIED PRIOR TO COMING OVER TO THE GKR SIDE. I REMARKED THAT PERHAPS THIS IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE WAY TO END THE WAR, I.E. TO ARRANGE INDIVIDUAL CEASEFIRES WITH UNITS ON THE OTHER SIDE IN ONE PLACE AFTER ANOTHER UNTIL THE FIGHTING HAS STOPPED COUNTRY-WIDE. LONG BORET SAID GIVEN THE GKR'S LIMITED RESOURCES, THERE IS NO OTHER WAY POSSIBLE.

KEELEY

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DIA.

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ARMISTICE, MILITARY DEFECTORS, COMBAT ZONES, COMBAT OPERATIONS, PEACE PLANS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 13 SEP 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** kelleyw0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974PHNOM12305  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740256-0610  
**From:** PHNOM PENH  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740947/aaaabobg.tel  
**Line Count:** 98  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 2  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** kelleyw0  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 24 JUL 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <24 JUL 2002 by martinml>; APPROVED <19 MAR 2003 by kelleyw0>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** KC SECTOR 33 APPROACH TO GKR  
**TAGS:** PINS, MOPS, CB  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005